

## Introduction: Memory, Landscape and Archaeology

Prehistorians have typically examined long-term continuities when approaching the subject of memory, tending to look at the reuse of a people's material remains by later generations. In these cases, the material is treated as a transmitter for social memories, and its long history of use as evidence of historical significance. Examples may be timber circles, built by one generation and then removed and replaced with stones by a subsequent generation of inhabitants; or roundhouses built and subsequently abandoned by one generation being transformed into a cairn by later generations. In these cases, actions undertaken by later generations express some reverence for their predecessors through choosing to commemorate, or avoid, their material remains. Thus, memories become materialised as actions that are undertaken by one generation at a place with historical significance.

Archaeologists have written extensively on this subject in thought-provoking works that consider the material aspect of memory-making and the establishment of significant places. However, the role that landscape plays in these processes is rarely considered. Very often we overlook that the materials with which people interact are set into a living, changing environment. How would the above examples differ in a rapidly changing lowland versus a slow-changing upland? Would an inhabitant's ability to trace the actions of past generations differ if the material residues were placed in a tidal zone, subject to erosion and inundation from daily tidal rhythms, or a moorland, where most environmental changes occur slowly over years or decades?

Memories manifest through materials; experiencing and re-experiencing these materials is key to the process of recollection, which affects inhabitation. The materiality of landscape is key to this process. The stability of that material, its relative ability to change or remain the same over time, will impact how people inhabit their world. How would experiencing the materiality of landscape be impacted in a stable moorland, subject to the relatively slow processes of erosion, or a dynamic valley marshland, subject to relatively fast processes of inundation and changes in vegetation?

This research aims to understand the role of a landscape's ability to change or remain the same in creating and preserving memories. In pursuit of this goal, this work makes four assertions: an individual's experience of dwelling within a place is affected by the materiality of the place, and as that materiality changes, experience may change; memories manifest through materials, and the stability of those materials has a bearing on how people

come to know a place and remember it; and the landscape in which inhabitation occurs is actively engaged in how people form memories of that place.

The study's methodology, based heavily on GIS and spatial observations, serves to ground the theoretical framework, outlined in this chapter, as a means of researching landscapes. Two regions across southwestern Britain serve as case studies, aiming to apply the theoretical and methodological framework across various environments. These are northwestern Bodmin Moor and the central Brue Valley on the Somerset Levels. While the project's methodology will be expanded upon in chapter two, the remainder of this chapter will serve as a literature review and will aim to unpack the major themes from which this project's philosophy is built.

The remainder of this chapter will address themes of, among others, inhabitation, affordance and mnemonics, taskscape and the perceptions of time, and in doing so will cite ethnographic examples which highlight wider discussion on inhabited places and their role in social memory. This serves in part to prime the reader for the study's theoretical approach, which derives from two ideas; the first is 'memory, inhabitation and mnemonics', which focuses on how people inhabit the world and come to know historically significant places; the second is 'materiality, stability and recollection', which examines the role of material culture in indexing the past and the recollection which occurs when people interact with these materials.

### 1.1. Experiencing Landscapes

#### 1.1.1. *Space and Movement*

Aspects of the natural world are not prepared for the individual living there; instead, interactions with the landscape reveal these aspects (Ingold, 1993: 156). Tim Ingold characterises these interactions as 'embodiment', defined as incorporating human features into the landscape, rather than 'inscription'. The latter characterises a situation in which the landscape assumes a passive role, as something onto which individuals inscribe features. Incorporation comes about through the movements undertaken during an organism's life cycle. These interactions allow for a greater understanding of the natural world as individuals assign their encultured markers to the landscape (Thomas, 2001), and the resulting relationship creates culturally significant places. This understanding of the world occurs as individuals undertake the acts which constitute dwelling. Dwelling within a landscape, experiencing its

contours and topography, is what allows its character to emerge (Fraser, 2004). The movements enacted as part of this experience allow an individual to become acquainted with a space and assign it significance (Schmidt, 2018), and as movements become habitual tasks they contribute to the relational context of dwelling, allowing spaces to become a fixture in everyday life.

Privileging movement in this way holds the body as the main point of experience and interpretation of the world, a point of view otherwise called phenomenology (Tilley, 2012). Phenomenology is a philosophical approach that seeks to describe human experience. Interpretations of phenomenology's role in landscape archaeology vary. Joanna Brück (2005) describes phenomenology as a method used by archaeologists to understand the human experience through interactions between individuals and their surroundings. Thomas (2001) uses phenomenology to argue that space will gain significance through human involvement. As individuals experience a place, its textures, colours, sound and the mnemonics assigned to them, the materiality of that place is revealed (Hamilakis, 2014).

Within archaeology, Chris Tilley's (1994) *A Phenomenology of Landscape* is a seminal, and at times divisive, work incorporating the philosophical principles of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Martin Heidegger (1971) into a study of past people and past landscapes. Essential to this are experiences and the description of things as being experienced. Tilley (1994: 13–14) expounds on a narrative understanding of the world, wherein a current experience takes meaning from a previous experience. Previous experiences exist in a current context, and actions are a process of describing and redescribing a place. The places themselves are material references for histories, myths and stories.

Crucial to phenomenology is the experience of a landscape from 'within' and a focus on the materiality of a landscape. Knowing a place's physical elements happens through their relevance to other places. The definition of a place cannot be non-contextual (Tilley, 2012). This thinking has drawn noted criticism,<sup>1</sup> not least for its emphasis on a visual approach to experiencing places. Vicki Cummings (2002) expounds a scepticism about this approach, focusing instead on touch as the only sense mediating the bond between an individual and the world. Cummings examines the megaliths of southwestern Scotland and Wales, positing that the visible weathering of specific stones predates their inclusion in Neolithic monuments. Cummings argues that, during construction, the choice and positioning of stones were due, in part, to their texture, and points to carved stone balls, pottery and lithics as other indicators of the importance of textures in prehistory. Among her examples are Cairnholy I, where positioning

textured stones at the tomb entrance necessitated that people interact with that texture upon entering the tomb, and the Cave of Kilhern, where its construction used light-coloured smooth stones in contrast with dark-coloured rough stones in a clear east–west divide (2002: 253–54).

In another study of Scottish megaliths, Aaron Watson and David Keating (1999) examine architecture and sound at East Aquorthies stone circle and Camster Round passage grave. Watson and Keating examine the behaviour and perception of sound waves within these monuments, noting the experiential difference in the acoustics from within and outside each site. Their experiments demonstrated that stone placement influenced sound waves' movement; those people situated within the circle were privileged to a deeper range of acoustics than those outside of it. At Camster Round, a similar phenomenon occurs; the acoustics were at their best inside the tomb and immediately outside the passage entrance. However, those situated further away from the grave did not encounter the full range of acoustics but did experience vibrations via infrasonic frequency (1999: 331).

Regarding a visual approach and Tilley's (1994; 2012) example of living within a dense forest or an open landscape, the Zafimaniry people of Madagascar may provide insight. The impact of deforestation on their agricultural practices is the subject of Maurice Bloch's (1995) ethnography. The Zafimaniry, living within a forested landscape, value visual clarity and regard a degree of deforestation as providing this clarity. Those settlements that sit at higher altitudes are regarded as more important because they are 'in the clear' and more visible to those traversing the forested higher ground (1995: 70). This circumstance might be juxtaposed with the increasing number of Zafimaniry living on low-lying, recently deforested plains. According to Bloch, the Zafimaniry regard much of this deforestation positively, as it allows for greater visual clarity. While this example might support Tilley's visual approach, other ethnographies emphasise auditory and olfactory impressions of a forest. For example, the Huaorani people dwell within Amazonia and prioritise hunting within the forested landscape. Laura Rival (1996) describes knowing the forest through animal behaviours, seasonal fruiting and the growth and decay of vegetation. These aspects of the environment allow the Huaorani to know the landscape, using them as references when recounting the successes and failures of their hunt during daily discussions. In Papua New Guinea, another densely forested landscape, the Kaluli use sound for acoustic orientation, allowing them to know a place without the aid of visuals. Steven Feld (1996) gives the example of a waterfall, a forest feature capable of being experienced when not seen and which may change acoustically depending on the time of day and season. However, for the Kaluli, an interplay between visuals, smells and sounds is crucial to knowing a place. Although Tilley's emphasis on vision holds merit, it is the amalgamation of all senses which leads to one's actual perception of a place.

<sup>1</sup> For a fuller discussion of the critique of phenomenology and its relation to this study see Dwan, 2022.

In *Landscape Phenomenology, GIS and the Role of Affordance*, Mark Gillings (2012: 605) addresses what he sees as tension within landscape archaeology, specifically between experiential theory and GIS-led work. Gillings offers affordance as an alternative to phenomenology for understanding spatial relationships between individuals and places. For a deeper explanation, he references J. J. Gibson (1979): an environment will reveal different properties to the individual depending on changing circumstances. Gibson argues that within an environment, encoded meaning exists to be perceived by an animal embedded within that environment. This theory of perception is an alternative to one that forms in the mind from raw sensory data. Gillings asked us to approach affordance as the relationship between animals and landscape: a relationship that places the landscape as an active participant instead of as something to be utilised by the animal. Critically, affordance is a relationship with mutual participation. Removing the animal from this relationship would negate the mutuality of affordance.

Affordance then becomes what Gillings calls ‘feature placing’, described as an individual’s ability to perceive that a situation has a given ‘feature’ which requires an action to be undertaken by the individual perceiving it. Gillings offers the example of flooding as a perceived feature that would require action taken upon it by the individual. In an argument akin to Gibson’s, Gillings expands on his example. Affordances are not properties of the environment. They are encoded meanings held within the environment that the individual perceives (Gillings, 2012: 606). Years before this, Ingold had written that an organism’s forms are not genetic; they result from environmental stimuli. Variations in human construction, for example, are not genetic products; instead, they are a reaction to inhabiting a world furnished by past humans (Ingold, 1995: 186). Gillings’ notion of encoded meaning is reminiscent of Bender’s (2002) view that places change over time, and constant movement through and between places allows for reinterpretation. It may be that the nature of qualities afforded to an animal will change as the animal re-experiences the environment.

Ingold (2007: 25) examines Gibson’s (1979) work, specifically his distinction between the ‘physical world’ and an ‘environment’. The former is composed of the planet Earth and the atmosphere surrounding it, and the latter is a world that exists as a perception of its inhabitants. The reality of the environment is not a reality of objects; instead, it is a reality of the beings that live in that world. Ingold (2007: 34) looks to understand what it means to dwell within an open world, one where the influences of the wind, weather and Earth participate in the environment’s formation and impact how inhabitants come to know the environment in which they dwell. Ingold summarises Gibson’s view of the world as an open surface covered in objects with which people interact and to which they relate. Ingold differs from this and describes an open world with the air as a medium, in which inhabitants are immersed

in this medium and experience its everyday fluxes. These fluxes are the continuous shifts in the wind and weather and their impact on the Earth. In a follow-up paper, Ingold describes moving across this world as negotiating one’s way through the Earth and weather instead of simply traversing the Earth. Knowledge of places and the world at large then grows as people make their way through the world through everyday activities (Ingold, 2010: 121–22).

### 1.1.2. Time and Temporality

Moving through an environment and experiencing places is one aspect of placemaking. Also crucial is time as an element in experiencing a place. Across days, seasons and years, through sustained and episodic stays, places change their forms and meanings. Bender (2002) observes that seasons occur in yearly cycles; they vary memorably in their incarnations from one year to the next. Time is a characteristic of places. Perceptions of time will vary, be they event-driven, clock and calendar-based, or viewed through the lenses of mythologies or histories. It is time, in conjunction with movement, that colours an individual’s experience of a place.

An individual’s conscious experience of the time will be characterised by observable changes in the world. These changes could otherwise be thought of as natural rhythms which influence how people relate to a place, structure daily life and aid in creating places and linking people to their past. Examples of natural rhythms are hunger, sleep, heartbeats, sunrise and sunset. In this framework, a living body perceives not time or space but instead movement, primarily through natural rhythms. Physical sensations, strains and stresses with a corresponding activity undertaken at a specific location around a specific time (Schmidt, 2018: 308).

These experiences are framed partially through corresponding events, holidays, meetings and sociopolitical or historical circumstances. One could then argue in favour of time having a qualitative aspect and suggest that engagements with time are largely subjective. The values assigned to time and place would then depend on a context defined by social, political and historical parameters (Adam, 1994: 509–10).

Bender (2002) applies this thinking more specifically, arguing that historical and social qualities necessary to the community in question might impact their perception of the time and the landscape in which they dwell. She then concludes that the meaning ascribed to a landscape will reflect this context. Bender incorporates time with landscape thus: ‘landscape is time materialised or, better, landscape is time materialising’. This materialisation is always subject to the perceiver’s outlook. Through this, she refers to the ‘plurality of place’. An individual’s experience of a place will vary based on their position in the landscape; theoretically, that individual could form multiple perceptions of one place (2002: 103–07).

Bender's approach views the individual and the landscape subjectively. She asks how a subjective experience will impact the sense of place and the role of the landscape's qualities.

Considering the landscape as lived-in and shifting, how might one imagine the temporality of an active landscape which works in congress with dwellers? Ingold (1993) characterises temporality as neither chronology, a system of dates, history nor events referenced by their place in a sequence. Instead, temporalities emerge in the everyday tasks undertaken while dwelling within a place. Humans experience time socially and in chunks of experience punctuated by feasts, religious rites and other social events. The same is true of everyday tasks undertaken as part of dwelling. Ingold specifies measuring these happenings in social time due to the social interactions that occur over that time and cautions against separating humans from events. Tasks allow for an active relationship between humans and their environment; it is within performing tasks that the processes of social life carry forward. This system, formed through socially active tasks, has been referred to as the 'taskscape'.

In its simplest form, the taskscape represents time and landscape through actions and comes into being as people experience the world as active participants (Ingold, 1993). In this way, the taskscape exists through the habitual actions that comprise everyday living (Edmonds, 1997). These tasks could be the seasonal journeys of Mesolithic communities or the vast construction projects undertaken at monuments by resident Neolithic communities. For mobile communities, the taskscape may entail seasonal movement, tenure over routeways, and the interactions with other communities which occur therein. These scales, regularities and durations of acts contribute to how the existence of a taskscape allows inhabitants to know their surroundings. Repetition, tradition and memory are essential to the taskscape.

When time is viewed through a social lens it becomes easier to acknowledge that multiple temporalities physically coexist (Hamilakis, 2014). Social time relies on a material's ability to endure and embody multiple temporalities. For example, an ancestral monument will embody the time of its construction and any modifications, rituals or other activity undertaken therein. Yannis Hamilakis provides the example of fourth-century BCE petroglyphs on the island of Poros in Greece, which bear the inscribed initials of children who lived nearby during the nineteenth century CE. Therefore, social time treats the past and present not as successive to one another but as temporalities that coexist.

Within the taskscape, dwelling encompasses an organism's entire time on Earth and all movements and expressions therein. When landscape features are viewed as 'collapsed acts', the landscape becomes an embodied form of the taskscape. One may then think of acts as never completed,

and as a result, the landscape is never truly stagnant and is perpetually being built and rebuilt.

## **1.2. Historically Constituted Landscapes**

### ***1.2.1. Inhabiting the Past***

Actions executed at specific places are the embodied form of experiences. These actions may include references to other times and other places. Inhabiting a place among these references adds meaning to the act of inhabitation and allows a place to have continued meaning. Reworking these references leads to a change in the landscape's inhabitation. Thomas (1996) describes spaces as rendered significant through human involvement; a place remains significant despite its ever-changing status. However, space is more than a blank area where people build culture. As people interact with space, significant places emerge; therefore, the way people move and experience a place is fundamental. When people are at home with their surroundings and feel familiar, a relationship with place exists, a relationship otherwise known as dwelling (Heidegger, 1977; Thomas, 1996: 89).

For Ingold (1993), the taskscape's embodied form is an inhabited landscape, wherein features serve as the material residue of past generations' actions: an idea expanded on by Barrett (1999b), who suggests that people will often inhabit a world that has been furnished by those who preceded them. One could say that an inhabited place comprises references to past experiences, past tasks and those who executed them.

Returning to Ingold (1993), tasks take meaning from and are assigned value through reference to other tasks. If the tasks themselves are temporal actions and if, as Adam (1994) argues, the perception of time is context-based, a task's meaning must be context-based. Those performing the task, and those observing, will often rework and adjust that task based on their reading of the present context (Barrett, 1999a). Therefore, the meaning of an ancestral feature, otherwise thought of as a collapsed act (Ingold, 1993), can be adjusted. A shift may occur in meaning from that assigned by a prior inhabitant to one in keeping with contemporary inhabitants. References associated with that feature have changed to embody different meanings (Barrett, 1999a). In 'The Mythical Landscapes of the British Iron Age', Barrett (1999b) offers a summation: tasks themselves do not give meaning to the social; instead, inhabitation constructs meaning, and a cultural shift or change in observer can change the meanings of tradition. Barrett's argument highlights the temporary nature of inhabitation.

Barrett's (1999a) example is the change in usage at Stonehenge during the late Bronze Age and early Iron Age, reasoning it fell out of use as inhabitants altered the surrounding landscape, allowing other features to become the centre of focus. A change to its surroundings

shifted Stonehenge's frame of reference for the communities occupying the landscape. The emphasis on other monuments allowed Stonehenge to be, in a sense, overshadowed. The henge's significance became less contemporary and more that of an ancestral monument. Stonehenge and its surrounding landscape came to exist in two different historically constituted frames of reference, one as a relic of the past and another as a place of present significance to that community: a place of rich history that also referenced a broader culture. As a result, Stonehenge is an example of Bender's (2002) plurality of place; the henge functioned as a reference point for contemporary and ancestral meaning. Situating oneself within a place of multiple references may be like viewing multiple temporalities. Continuing Stonehenge as an example, one temporality represents the time of the present individual who may have changed a social tradition. The other represents a past time that references aspects of that tradition that are 'timeless' (Barrett, 1999a; 1999b). These actions may include customs, events or other cultural markers serving as situational thresholds between temporalities (Durkheim, 1976 [1915]) As a person experiences these temporalities, social memories become more pertinent to daily life.

Humans inhabit a landscape given to them by previous generations and will therefore dwell within their residues: monuments, burials, agricultural remains and any other built features found inscribed in an otherwise natural landscape.

Barrett (1999b: 257) describes an 'archaeology of inhabitation' wherein

material no longer simply represents the consequence of processes which we need to discover but become instead the historically constituted and necessary conditions of a world inhabited, interpreted, and acted upon. Whereas previously, archaeological remains were regarded as a trail of debris generated by the passing of the processes of history, where each epoch left its own distinctive signature upon the record, now each generation can be regarded as having to confront its own archaeology as the material remains of its past piled up before it.

Barrett reasons that, as remains of the Neolithic were not absent from Bronze Age life, so were the Bronze Age remains present in daily Iron Age life. A significance lies in a place where contemporary inhabitants must consider their own lives and the accumulated biographies of past inhabitants. The inhabited place becomes known with reference to past experiences. When others recognise these experiences, they become socially meaningful. These actions set them within a broader and more objectively recognised frame of reference that acknowledges the past (Barrett, 1999b). We may return now to Barrett's (1999a) example in Stonehenge. Despite changing the reference within which the henge sat, later features

demonstrate the desire to inhabit a landscape laden with ancestral residue. These newer features demonstrate the significance of the place, which utilises both ancestral and contemporary references. Allowing Stonehenge to retain some prominence within the landscape indicates how later inhabitants accommodated the remains of previous ones.

Ingold (1993) describes these residues as collapsed acts, the remains of actions undertaken at some point in the past. Is the execution of actions and tasks the sole qualifier of inhabitation? John Barrett (1999b: 260) classifies inhabitation on a deeper level as 'a process of understanding the relevance of actions executed at someplace by reference to another time and another place'. Barrett makes a point reminiscent of Meinig (1979): memory is crucial to inhabitation; inhabiting a space requires living amongst the residue of those who previously occupied that space. To briefly revisit Schmidt (2018), this transformation of a space into a place allows the world to become concrete to us. The actions undertaken at these residue-laden places create a connection between past inhabitants. As actions become accepted by a community through convention and tradition, they form an association with the past. This association informs the recognition of historically significant places.

### 1.2.2. Mnemonics

The role of recollection is, no doubt, key to understanding how inhabitants relate to a landscape filled with historical residues. Recollection through interface with material remains or in familiar customs is the founding of social memories.

As objects and features in the landscape become familiar, they refer to deeper cultural ideals, evoking meaning even after the generation which instilled that meaning is gone. Bender (2002) takes this thinking further; memories related to a time and a place may not be memories of that time and place. Instead, aspects of a place have mnemonics assigned to them. As individuals move between places, the mnemonics will move with them and become assigned to aspects of new places. Through this process, inhabitation reveals a network of places bound together by memories and cultural ideals (Thomas, 2001).

To reiterate Barrett's (1999b) main point, the residue of earlier individuals allows for contemporary inhabitation of a landscape laden with ancestral memories, just as Bronze Age materials would have done for Iron Age inhabitants. In this example, the ancestral residue is a mnemonic. Interacting with it results in recollections that allow for contemporary connections with historical places. In this way, recollection aids in present inhabitation.

Paul Connerton (1989) describes bodily practices as a means for recollection that does not require images and words. Instead, movements and actions serve as mnemonics devices, keeping the past in mind without advertising a

historical origin. Two types of social practice may represent recollection via movement: incorporated actions and inscribed actions (Connerton, 1989). Incorporated actions are enacted by a body and remain present only so long as the body is present to sustain the activity – an example of this being situationally appropriate postures. A ceremonial or ritual context might call for a specific posture or way of holding oneself. This bodily action would communicate the ceremony's importance to onlookers while also filling the role of an active reminder to the participant. Alternatively, inscribed actions are those which trap a message in such a way that it will exist after the body has stopped informing – an example being a handwriting sample or a photograph. These mediums will have served as mnemonic devices for recalling the original performer's message long after the act ended. Importantly, inscribed and incorporated movements are not mutually exclusive. Connerton argues these as examples of recollection that do not guarantee mnemonic devices. However, the example of postures used in a ceremonial context may serve as a movement-based mnemonic. Recalling and re-enacting these postures outside the ceremonial context will result in a recollection of that context. Returning to a point made earlier in this chapter, how an inhabitant moves through the landscape is often habitual. The examples given by Connerton are, similarly, habitual, and through them, an inhabitant knows their world and may feel an association with the past. In the case of an inscribed action, an image or symbol may communicate a cross-cultural message. The message associated with the symbol will remain long after its creator has gone. Similarly, a familiar residue, be it the remains of a field system, stone circle, henge or otherwise, could serve as a symbol, interacting with which would cause recollection.

Andrew Jones reasons that memories come into being, more simply, through the interaction between people and material culture. Recollection emerges because of sensory experiences evoked during this interaction. In *Memory and Material Culture*, Jones's (2007) example is a Neolithic stone axe, an object one might associate with forest clearance. Jones poses the question of who is responsible for felling the tree, the person using the axe or the axe itself, ultimately resolving that both parties are equally responsible. So, forest clearing is the result of interaction between person and material. When considering the relationship between humans and material, one can move from viewing the axe as a mnemonic for forest clearing to one of trade networks, craftworking, gift exchange and accompanying social interactions.

One might consider the production and use of an axe as both an inscriptive and incorporative act. The same could be said for a written alphabet, a key difference being that the axe as a symbol will serve as a more effective mnemonic than the entire alphabet. Further to Jones's question of responsibility, one could ask who is responsible for evoking a memory: the present individual, the ancestral residue or the landscape wherein that residue sits? While

the individual's role is that of an observer, the residue of mnemonic, like the landscape, is by no means passive. The materiality of the landscape will serve as a component of that mnemonic, and the landscape's capacity to change or remain the same will impact the individual's ability to read the residue.

Though it is not entirely dissimilar to Connerton's (1989) argument regarding recollection happening through bodily practice, Jones (2007) outlines his own set of methods for which material culture can aid in recollection. In one case, materials will remain the same as a person changes, with the material serving as an echo of the past. Alternatively, the material and the person both change, with the material coming to represent the passage of time. Through both examples, the material culture serves as a mnemonic device for indexing the past, while the material's impact on the individual's senses aids in present recollection. Contingent on this is both the temporality of the individual and the durability of the material culture. The person's temporal evaluation of the material, or of its remains, creates the notion of memory. This is a notion that may extend to craftwork: the act of creating an object can serve as a mnemonic process; this also inspires greater variation in the memories associated with it (Jones, 2007; Rowlands, 1993).

### **1.3. Mnemonic Practices and Collective Memories**

The same long-term choreography and reuse of materials will evoke memories by way of practices, traditions and rites. These will serve as a performative means of keeping present individuals aware of the past and may represent genealogy or longstanding social traditions. Returning to an example from earlier in this chapter, in Papua New Guinea, inhabitants give drainage ditches the names of known individuals, a tradition that tracks genealogy dating back 500 years (Ballard, 1994; Gosden and Lock, 1998). This practice serves to aid in recalling these individuals during annual maintenance performed. The practicality of this drainage system and its need for regular maintenance imbues the landscape with a constant reminder of these individuals.

Another example is the maintenance of the Uffington White Horse in southern England (Gosden and Lock, 1998: 2–4). Regular cleaning of this chalk hill figure was a part of the spring festival for the village of Uffington until 1865. If a Late Bronze Age date (Miles and Palmer, 1995) is trusted, communal cleaning will have been regular for the past three millennia and, as Gosden and Lock specify, would have needed to be performed every five years at the least to prevent the chalk figure from disappearing. Maintenance would have been a social activity centred around this Bronze Age residue, the horse's longevity representing the material residue of this activity. Maintenance of this ancestral feature would allow people to distinguish between the present and the past. The 3,000-year custom of maintaining the horse indicates that

the first 1,000 or so years would have been within what is commonly considered prehistory. From this, Gosden and Lock (1998: 3) point out that, regardless of an individual's standing in prehistory or history, 'people structured their contemporary world not just with regard to the exigencies of the present, but also through a complex consciousness of the past'. Furthermore, maintenance acts allow for a recollection of the past, acknowledging history while inhabiting the present.

### 1.3.1. Rites

The taskscape (section 1.1.2) exemplifies a practical understanding of the world, upheld through supposed mundane activities. By contrast, it stands to reason that the activities performed during ceremonies and rituals may have done the same for a different understanding of the world. The key to this argument is that the society that practices the ritual will experience change over time. Despite these changes, rituals can aid in preserving underlying social order and establishing cultural norms. While a more robust definition of rituals, as they pertain to this study, and the role of rituals in manipulation of a social order is available elsewhere (Dwan, 2022), this section will focus on rituals as a means for recalling the past.

Richard Bradley (1991), in *Ritual, Time and History*, argues that rituals communicate through their patterns of unique rhythms and gestures to exist in a temporality outside of the understanding of time established in day-to-day tasks. The example of the Uffington White Horse echoes this; maintenance of ancestral monuments is a ritualised act meant to preserve the remembrance of the past (Gosden and Lock, 1998). Rituals create a sense of stability in an otherwise shifting world.

Connerton (1989) describes rites as a specific form of ritualistic act that is expressive not of a strategic goal or a specific end but instead through their regularity. Regularity is significant; it implies continuity with the past and normalcy within the present, allowing for the rite to serve as a component of present life that evokes specific memories. Rites which Connerton describes as 'backward-looking calendrical', those that take place on the same day or annually, inspire the participants to dwell on memories of the rite's past iterations. Whether the ceremonies mark a birth, feast day or equinox, that time of year will evoke memories of the ceremony. Perpetuating specific versions of the past through rituals allows history to become a myth and be thought of as unchanging.

When considered as a mnemonic, rites are not unlike the stone axe example given by Jones (2007). Examples are found in the large-scale communal construction of henges and other monuments, or in a settlement in which all dwellings are oriented towards a specific direction or feature. These mnemonics are a way of codifying memories. In *The Translation of time*, Bradley (2003) seeks

to understand how memories become distorted over time until they are essentially a myth. He finds this issue most notably in oral narratives. However, he admits that even writing, a supposedly more accurate recording, may distort or remove context essential to understanding the original memory. Bradley suggests that objects may accurately catalogue memories, citing the role of monuments as mnemonics, as their scale may represent the large-scale community effort needed during construction. Although monuments themselves comprise many components, their impact on an individual will be coloured, in part, by that individual's own biases, positioning and experiences. The monument may serve as a mnemonic for the memory of its construction and the memory of rituals undertaken there or of past individuals associated with the monument. In this way, a mnemonic is a subjective tool in recollection, and neither the monument nor the individual will be passive in the relationship. Rituals allow for conveying memories that remain unstated or subconscious. These are ingrained communal memories and are instrumental in defining the character of our experiences. To Adrian Chadwick and Catriona Gibson (2013), we would be 'strangers to one another' without these memories.

### 1.3.2. Collective Memory

Crucial to the preservation of memories is how they are transmitted across space and between generations. When placed in a passive role, the landscape assumes the role of an object. An object capable of carrying cultural significance is associated with a specific ideal or version of the past (Bender, 2002). The significance is associated with being vulnerable to manipulation through rituals and commemorative actions.

Collective memory may be defined as an understanding of the past shared by two or more individuals (Mixer and Henry, 2017). The resulting narrative is concentrated on the past and rooted in the present with influence from society's present concerns. From this logic, one can suppose that two groups of people might form opposing versions of the same past events based on the present concerns of their own culture. This allows for social memories to be in a near-constant state of flux (Shackel, 2003).

More important to consider are the questions posed by Bradley (2003), who asks how long these memories can remain intact and which methods of preserving memories are most effective, and if a culture can consciously forget or change these memories. Bradley considers the role of oral narratives as the transmission of collective memories but acknowledges that these are easily subject to distortion. Recording memories via the building and reuse of monuments is similarly problematic, as changing narratives can adjust the circumstance and purpose of a monument's construction. From this, a tension between the enduring nature of some monuments and a change in their use becomes possible. The social and political circumstances of the past would have rested on processes

of remembering and forgetting, including remembering by forgetting. In other words, recalling a thing, be it an object, person or event, would often occur after that thing was gone. Interpretation of the past will always be needed to fill in any gaps left by human or material preservation limits.

In a society where memories are knowledge, they are susceptible to manipulation by elites; this may occur through the usage and control of sacred and ancestral materials and landscapes. Some have argued against this ‘top-down’ model (Mixer and Henry, 2017) which leaves memories as tools for the elites. There is no doubt that non-elites would have had just as much agency in creating the memories which assert a desired version of the past. As a result, versions of the past will differ across communities, households and individuals.

#### **1.4. Practical Manifestations of History and Memory**

##### ***1.4.1. Maintenance and Reuse***

As mentioned towards the beginning of this chapter, the components of a monument and the phases of its occupation have long been a primary avenue for prehistorians to explore memories manifested as materials. The stages of construction in a monument’s long-term occupation represent transforming a society’s history into shared memory (Loney and Hoaen, 2005). Monuments originate from an established relationship with a place, and revisiting that place solidifies its significance. When this happens over generations, it expresses its importance in social memory. Bradley (2000) argues that acts of maintenance and reuse make evident that preserving the past was a social norm and looks to the sequences of construction found at Machrie Moor on the Isle of Arran. Machrie Moor’s earliest iteration was a timber circle, which was later removed and, after a period of agriculture, replaced with a stone circle positioned over the original timbers. Plough marks indicated that agricultural activity actively avoided traces of the timber circle, suggesting some knowledge of the future intention to replace it with stone, and may have represented a method of cleansing the land between construction phases (Bradley 2002: 90–94).

Anna Garnett’s (2013) study of Egyptian river valleys at Wadi Mia and Wadi Hellal demonstrates a similar theme. Both sites served as spiritually important centres during the sixth and fifth millennia BCE before being chosen as the sites of temples for Sety I and Amenhotep III, respectively, during the fourth millennium. Petroglyphs carved at both Wadis during the sixth and fifth millennia BCE suggest their role as locally significant places and may have aided in their selection for temple installation. These temples would have served as a refuge for travellers during the dynastic period. Greco-Roman petroglyphs, modern graffiti and other activities from the temples’ afterlife denote their continual usage as sanctuaries. Garnett refers to this as the ‘long-term choreography’ of a place. The elites who built the temples and pastoralists who carved the

glyphs contributed to these places’ continuing significance and role as a shelter for travellers. Separately, Garnett makes a case for remembering by forgetting. Amenhotep III’s temple at Wadi Hellal was defaced after his death: an act that may have created a reminder for an onlooker of the temple’s appearance before being desecrated.

It is crucial to remember that the significance of a place will exist before and continue after installing any large monuments. Additionally, the way later generations use and modify these monuments will happen regardless of what the monument builders had intended (Rogers, 2013) and often will involve a level of destruction. For example, at Pierowall Quarry in Orkney, Iron Age roundhouses were often built over Neolithic and early Bronze Age chambered tombs. In some cases, builders demolished tombs to provide a platform for roundhouse construction (Sharples, 2017). The roundhouse was later abandoned on several of these instances, infilled, leaving very little immediate dwelling evidence. The process may have served to cleanse the landscape in a process similar to that at Machrie Moor (Bradley, 2002). Those who occupied the dwellings built overtop an ancestral tomb would have controlled access to the tomb and the ancestors – in so doing, controlling some element of the memory and shared history associated with this tomb which may have served as a source of political legitimacy.

These examples of reuse tend to be characterised by long-term inhabitation; this is the case in Gary Robinson et al. (2013) study of the Nornour roundhouse settlement located on the eastern side of the Scilly archipelago, southwestern Cornwall. The roundhouses appear built into hillslopes and natural hollows, often near ephemeral traces of past inhabitation such as hearths and pits. Robinson refers to these as ‘memory-traps’ which create lineages of inhabitation, activated through material traces of previous generations. The occupation was not homogeneous, but a habitual pattern appearing in the cycle of construction, occupation and abandonment (2013: 153). During abandonment, a consistent theme is the infilling of each roundhouse with rubble, animal bone and dark organic soil derived from the house’s midden. For those dwelling within the roundhouse, materials brought inside would have transformed into artefacts and food before being later deposited outside into a midden, and finally brought back into the roundhouse upon abandonment. In this way, inhabitants returned all material associated with the house to the confines of the dwelling upon its abandonment (2013: 157).

The life of these materials and the people involved are crucial to the process of remembrance. One must bear in mind that the presence of an object is not a substitute for memory, as an object’s absence will similarly evoke memory. Social memories are fluid, and so they are always open to being contested. Memories themselves are only partially grounded in materiality and should not be considered a product of that materiality. The formation of social memories is instead a process of drawing on



memories of groups and individuals – in doing so, allowing people a sense of the past which extends beyond what they remember individually (2013: 159–60).

#### **1.4.2. Association and Avoidance**

Association with the material remains of the past may occur explicitly through the means described above or through the choice to situate present activities in proximity to traces of previous inhabitation. Alternatively, the subtle avoidance of ancestral materials indicates an awareness of the feature's significance. At the Nornour settlement, roundhouses tended to remain close to traces of previous generations, a trend which embodies Robinson's idea of a 'lineage of inhabitation', otherwise defined as social cohesion activated by the material remains of previous generations (Robinson et al., 2013). An individual dwelling within a roundhouse near these materials would have secured some association with the past and, in doing so, may have retained control over it, expressing their role as a person of importance. Association with ancestral features may occur explicitly through the means described above or through the choice to construct newer features in proximity to older ones. Alternatively, the subtle avoidance of ancestral features also indicates an awareness of the feature's significance.

Proximity to and visibility of an ancestral monument may have held a social charge. For example, in the Peak District, the large-scale Neolithic monuments of Arbor Low henge and Long Low barrow impacted the Chalcolithic and early Bronze Age funerary landscape design. Alice Rogers's (2013) research uses viewshed analysis to demonstrate that if one were to walk along all of Long Low's 210 m length, 66 per cent of the surrounding barrows would become visible. Roger implies a deliberately created sacred zone populated with those barrows visible around Long Low. In the case of Arbor Low, all barrows within 500 m proximity have a clear view of the henge, but from within the henge itself, not one of these barrows is visible. In comparison, a barrow's visibility from Long Low was important to prehistoric communities, as was the view towards Arbor Low.

One could further explore the idea of acknowledgement through avoidance (Rogers, 2013) through the notion of hauntology: a concept which illustrates this and is defined as the 'presence of the absence', and a means to 'animate silenced agencies' (ten Harkel et al., 2012: 183). An example given by Letty ten Harkel et al. (2012) is the absence of early medieval settlement remains in areas of Dartmoor with abundant prehistoric remains. In some cases, Bronze Age barrows and Neolithic standing stones served as markers for established parish boundaries. In others, medieval communities actively avoided prehistoric monuments, possibly due to superstition.

In a similar instance, the Iron Age inhabitants at Pierowall Quarry may have built their roundhouses over Bronze Age barrow remains, but their Bronze Age

predecessors actively avoided most Neolithic remains (Sharples, 2017). Similarly, Iron Age brochs are not built over Neolithic chamber tombs in the Western Isles of Scotland, and Neolithic settlements do not have later activity on top of them. Rather than suggesting ignorance of their predecessors, this lack of reuse demonstrates that inhabitants were aware of these remains and actively chose to avoid them. On the Western Isles, the acknowledgement of Neolithic settlements during the Iron Age would have been through social memory, potentially passed on through oral tradition. Regardless of the motivation, the use of space, or lack of use, represents active avoidance on the part of medieval communities and in such an acknowledgement of prehistoric remains.

One could trace a similar behaviour as it relates to aspects of the natural world; this is observed in the spatial acknowledgement of prominent rock formations, called tors, across Bodmin Moor (Tilley, 1996; Bradley, 1998). Tilley (1996) points to two hilltop enclosures, Rough Tor and Stowe's Pound; both were built during the Neolithic and saw substantial remodelling during the Bronze Age. While the location of both enclosures offered poor conditions for settlement, with high wind and little access to water, both are associated with visually impressive tors. Nearby long cairns, another prominent Neolithic feature on Bodmin Moor, are oriented towards or visible from the tors while maintaining a reserved distance. Comparatively, Bronze Age tor-cairns do not keep this distance; instead, they incorporate the tors directly into their construction. These varying spatial relationships fuel Tilley's argument that tors served as 'non-domesticated' megaliths imbued with cultural significance in the Mesolithic imagination (1996: 165). Similarly, Bradley (1998), although at odds with Tilley (see Dwan, 2022 for greater elaboration), agrees that the tors earned a place of significance in the mind of prehistoric inhabitants. Bradley argues that tors resembled typology commonly found around the Irish Sea for Neolithic quoits and that inhabitants of the moorland interpreted and venerated the tors as ancestral structures. Quoits, like tors, are composed of granite, sit above the ground, and are often built near enclosures. Keeping proximity to, or distance from, the tors would have been born from a desire to venerate a built ancestral feature.

#### **1.5. This Project**

The works cited here inspired and motivated this study, something that will hopefully become clear as the reader encounters some of the themes and conclusions for which the methodology allows. In short, this chapter has sought to address the means by which individuals experience places and argue that an individual's experience within a landscape has historical and societal dimensions. As an individual dwells within this landscape, the passage of time manifests through actions. This, in turn, influences inhabitants and their understanding of the past.

A wealth of published literature exists on the visibility of memory within the archaeological record and how

memories were created, recollected and forgotten through actions executed at specific places and during specific times. What is absent, however, is an indication of the landscape as a participant in these processes. Admittedly, some literature does acknowledge the active role of the landscape, generally by comparison to those views that would present the landscape as passive and the subject of observation. Similarly, archaeologists and anthropologists have previously explored the idea of environments impacting a means of inhabitation and bearing on a knowledge of place. What this work chooses to address are those materials which have looked to trace memory within the archaeological record by way of documenting instances of reuse, repair and revisiting of ancestral places. It is in these works that little acknowledgement is given to the role of the environment, leading to a, most likely unintentional, impression of the landscape as a passive material.

The following chapters will aim to introduce the contrary idea, that landscapes are operative in the lives of those referred to here as inhabitants. Inhabiting a place involves a myriad of movements and actions which indicate an understanding of temporality, which adds to the growing knowledge of a place. These movements may become mnemonics, primarily habitual actions that bear a sense of remembrance by their nature. These will often incorporate interaction with materials and may be born from the resulting sensorial experience felt by the individual. When tied to a set culture, these mnemonics may be instrumental in transforming individual experiences into communal understandings of the past. As significant places emerge, they will retain an association with the past and grow in significance as later generations choose to revisit them or, in some cases, avoid them.

The work's overall aim is to ask what role a region's physical environment plays in the maintenance of social memory in the landscape. In asking this, three themes reoccurred: landmarks, concerned with the role of visually prominent or relatively stable landscape features as mnemonics for evoking memories and placing oneself within a landscape; creating continuity, concerned with continuity on a micro scale, through long-term reuse and repair of specific features, and on a macro scale, through the use of space to acknowledge the wider landscape as a significant place; and, finally, disruption and erasure, concerned with how a landscape's relative stability may lead to memories being lost or forgotten.

Throughout this work, discussions of long-term inhabitation and experiencing a landscape laden with historic significance are revisited, and it is through these discussions that the study meets one of its main goals: to express that landscapes are an active participant in how people inhabit a place. Additionally, the materiality of that landscape and the stability of that material bear significantly on the actions which form inhabitation. In

expressing this, the project's broader goal is to demonstrate that memory-making is a process not solely composed of human participants. Instead, it is one in which the landscape and the materiality of the places where people dwell serve an active role, influencing how memories are created, maintained and potentially lost.